statement that 'everything one experiences is permanently recorded in one's brain' (84% of the social workers agreeing with this statement). Similarly, Magnussen and Melinder's (2012) survey of 858 licensed psychologists in Norway revealed that the average number of responses deemed correct given by this sample (63%) was no different from a parallel survey of judges (63%) and not much higher than a survey of the general public (56%). Worryingly, Melinder and Magnussen (2014) found that psychologists and psychiatrists who served as expert witnesses in court were overall no more accurate in their beliefs about memory than those who did not serve as expert witnesses. It is noted that another recent survey of psychiatrists found that a large majority of them endorsed beliefs that were reported to be substantially inconsistent with what the authors deemed to be the more generally accepted view of the memory literature among academics and experts familiar with the subject (e.g., that "blocked memories" can result in physical symptoms like non-epileptic seizures; Kemp, Spilling, Hughes & de Pauw, 2013) .
Evidence consistently indicates that the public (and thereby potential jurors) as well as many professional groups (including those acting as investigators, witnesses to fact, and triers of fact) often hold beliefs about memory that are not in accord with the scientific literature.
Based on this evidence some argue that expert testimony may be required to inform decisionmaking at court (e.g., Howe, 2013 ). Yet there is resistance to admitting evidence from expert witnesses on memory in court proceedings. A judgment in the UK Royal Courts of Appeal exemplifies this. In R v Jonathan CWS (2006) the judges refused to admit expert testimony, arguing that some of the points made about the inherent unreliability of memory ("the memories of adults, going back into their childhood, could often be wrong") were simply "unremarkable" (paragraph 18). While Howe (2013) shares the goal of fewer memory researchers being called as expert witnesses to aid the jury, he nevertheless argues that it is unlikely, cautioning that until, "scientific knowledge becomes … familiar to triers of fact (judges, jurors), police, and laypeople, memory experts will continue to be an inexorable part of the legal process when memory serves as the main or only evidence" (p. 576; see also Conway, 2013; Zajac, Garry, London, Goodyear-Smith & Hayne, 2013) .
In summary, the results of surveys of the general public and professionals (including qualified practitioner psychologists) indicate that many people hold beliefs about memory that would be viewed with concern by most academics involved in memory research. One limitation with the existing literature is that it generally focuses on accredited or registered therapists, thus ignoring lay or "unqualified therapists" (Memon, 1995, p. 156; Weiskrantz, 1995 ; but see . The beliefs about memory held by unchartered therapists are important to gauge for at least two reasons. Firstly, such an individual may be someone to whom an individual may be referred for psychological counselling and -thus -may be instrumental in guiding a client toward an understanding of his or her memories (or lack of them). Secondly, although an unchartered therapist would not be called as an expert witness in relation to memory evidence (i.e., to give opinion evidence), they might well be called as a witness of fact (i.e., to give evidence before a jury about what a client could or could not recall at a given time during treatment). The only authors to date that have compared memory beliefs of research-oriented psychologists to clinicians and laypersons are . In that paper (Study 2) they found evidence of a substantial disparity in beliefs about memory between memory scientists and psychological practitioners (Clinical Psychologists, NLP therapists) relating to issues like the repression of traumatic memories (less than 30% of research-oriented psychologists agreed that 'traumatic memories are often repressed,' compared to 60% of respondents in their other participant groups). An exploratory factor analysis of their data revealed one key factor that summarized as 'belief in repressed memory or memory reliability' on which clinicalpsychology practitioners scored significantly higher than clinical psychology researchers.
To date, comparable data for UK clinicians is insufficient. It is important to obtain such comparative data because, in North America particularly, there has been intense legal scrutiny of memory science as a result of high profile court cases involving 'repressed' or 'recovered' memories (see for example, Loftus, 1998). Thus it is possible that, as a result of the publicity and debate surrounding such cases, the research findings concerning memory have been debated more widely in the psychological community in North America than elsewhere.
In the interests of full disclosure we note that the data reported in the present paper were collected some years ago (between 2007 and 2009), but not published, as part of a separate project (see Ost, Wright, Easton, Hope & French, 2013) . We were prompted to revisit these unpublished data by the rise in the UK in the number of reports of cases involving 'historic' or 'non-recent' allegations of abuse. That increase has been partly driven by successful prosecutions in several recent high profile cases (e.g., R v. Frank Maxwell Clifford, 2014; Office for National Statistics, 2013) . Beliefs about memory stability or malleability are, of course, central to such cases. The memory beliefs of UK psychology practitioners may be particularly important to report, as they are people to whom initial disclosures of sexual assault may be made -sometimes many years after the alleged events occurred -before being reported to the police.
We surveyed the beliefs of two groups of practitioners (Chartered Clinical Psychologists and unchartered therapists), and first year undergraduate psychology students in the United Kingdom. For the purposes of this study, the unchartered sample consisted of Hypnotherapists who advertised their services in a classified directory, the Yellow Pages™.
Hypnotherapists were selected for several reasons. Firstly, hypnosis was widely advocated during the 1980s and 1990s as a technique that could enable the recovery of forgotten memories of abuse (e.g., Poole, Lindsay, Memon & Bull, 1995) , despite evidence that this was not the case and that, in fact, its use might increase the likelihood of false memories (Pintar & Lynn, 2008) . Secondly, as Rook and Ward (2010, p. 887 ) -widely acknowledged legal authorities on sexual offence case law -note, it is "not unknown for allegations of sexual assaults, particularly in childhood, to be made following such [hypnotherapy] treatment". Finally, while advertising one's services as a Hypnotherapist in the Yellow Pages™ does not mean one is unqualified, it is assumed here that the majority of these individuals would have a different background with respect to training and engagement with more formal routes and accreditation processes from that of Chartered Clinical Psychologists.
The undergraduate sample was included to serve as a comparison group who may have more knowledge of psychology than a member of the general public (by virtue of relevant preuniversity education) but have not been exposed to the psychology degree programme and would be, at that point in their careers, untrained for professional practice.
Method Memory Beliefs Questionnaire (MBQ)
A Memory Beliefs Questionnaire (MBQ) was the final section of a larger questionnaire that was designed to gather data about respondents' beliefs and practices about recovered memory. The first section was entitled 'You and your practice' and respondents were asked to record demographic information, including their gender, their age bracket (21-30yrs; 31-40yrs; 41-50yrs; 51-60yrs; 61-70yrs; 71+), and how many years of postqualification practice they had (0-10yrs, 11-20 yrs, 21-30 yrs, 31+ yrs). The second section was entitled 'Your clients' memories of childhood sexual abuse'. The data from this part of the questionnaire are reported in Ost et al., (2013) . The final part of the questionnaire consisted of the MBQ, and is detailed below. Note that the Undergraduate sample completed only the MBQ questions as a pen and paper exercise at the start of their first introductory lecture at University.
The MBQ contained 11 statements about memory. Six of these items were either taken directly or in a slightly adapted form from Yapko's (1994) Talarico & Rubin, 2003) , that it is possible for an individual to develop 'false' memories of non-traumatic events (e.g., Hyman, Husband & Billings, 1995) , and that it is possible for an individual to develop 'false' memories of traumatic events (e.g., Porter,
Yuille & Lehman, 1999) 2 . As these last two statements were very similar (the first asking about the possibility that someone could falsely remember non-traumatic events and the second asking about the possibility that someone could falsely remember traumatic events) and were both moderately correlated (Pearson's r = .44, p < .005) the more contentious statement (i.e., false memory for traumatic events) was omitted from the calculation of the final scale.
The remaining ten statements comprised those about which a broad scientific consensus exists (see Table 1 ). Respondents were asked to indicate on a four-point scale (1 = strongly disagree) their endorsement of each statement. The internal consistency of these ten memory statements was reasonable (Cronbach's alpha = .73). A 'don't know' option was not considered appropriate given that two of the three target populations would be expected to have knowledge of memory science given either their training (Clinical / Licensed
Psychologists) or that they were advertising their professional services as therapists (Hypnotherapists). One item was positively phrased (such that an agree response was more in line with the scientific consensus), and the remaining nine were negatively keyed. To aid interpretation, the scores from nine of the ten items were subsequently reversed so that a higher score represented a response that was in line with the broad scientific consensus (the tenth item was already scored in that direction). These were then summed to produce a score between ten and 40 for each participant where a higher score meant that they had given responses to the ten items that were in line with the broad scientific consensus.
The final item on the MBQ asked respondents to rate their overall knowledge of the memory literature by responding to the following question: What best describes your
knowledge of the memory research literature relating to the long-term recall of trauma?
This question was taken from Yapko (1994) and adapted slightly so that the response options were qualified. The response options were: 'Below average' qualified with '(e.g., I rarely read relevant journal articles)'; 'Average' qualified with '(e.g., I occasionally read relevant journal articles)'; and 'Above average' qualified with (e.g., I regularly read relevant journal articles)'. For the purposes of analysis, responses were assigned values of one (below average), two (average) and three (above average).
Respondents and sampling procedure (original survey)
The sampling procedure and response rates for the original survey are included below. This is followed by the demographics for only those respondents who responded to all of the MBQ items as well as the 'knowledge of the memory literature'. Forty-three postcards were returned as undeliverable resulting in a potential sample of 957.
Chartered Clinical Psychologists (CCP):
One hundred and nineteen online questionnaires were completed, representing a return rate of 12.4%. Of these 119 respondents, 88 (73.9%) answered all of the items on the MBQ and the single 'knowledge of the memory literature' item.
Undergraduate students (UG):
The undergraduate psychology student sample (UG) consisted of 141 Year 1 students (24 male) attending an introductory psychology lecture given by the first author during their first week at University (Autumn / Fall semester 2009).
Of these, 124 (87.9%) answered all of the items on the MBQ and the single 'knowledge of the memory literature' item.
The following section provides the demographics and other relevant information for those respondents who responded to all the MBQ items as well as the 'knowledge of the memory literature' item.
Characteristics of responders. Undergraduates did not differ on this item.
Chartered Clinical Psychologists (CCP):
--- Table 1 Table 2 . Inspection of the loadings and the scree plot ( Figure 1 ) suggested a three-component solution that accounted for 52% of the variance in the memory belief scores.
--- Figure 1 about here ------ Table 2 about here ---Four items loaded onto the first component that we named quality ≠ accuracy. These items all relate to beliefs about how the self-reported qualities of a memory relate to accuracy of that memory (low scores on which indicate a belief that confidence, emotion, are indicative of the accuracy of a memory Cronbach's alpha = .68). Four items loaded on the second component, that we named memory = malleable. These items relate to beliefs about the malleability of memory (low scores on which indicate a belief that early memories are accurately stored and retrievable; that 'true' and 'false' memories can be reliably distinguished, Cronbach's alpha = .63). The final component (that we labelled outcomes) consisted of the two items relating to a belief that false memories cannot occur and that 'unconscious' repression can occur. As these two items were uncorrelated (r = -.01) and the eigenvalue was just over one (1.06), meaning that the combination of these two items was explaining only marginally more variance than if the two items were considered separately, this component was not analysed further.
Inspecting histograms and the measures of dispersion of the resultant z scores revealed that the quality ≠ accuracy component was normally distributed (skew of -.026) whereas the memory = malleable component had moderate positive skew (skew of 1.03). In order to test for differences between our samples on these components, two Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks tests were conducted which revealed that the difference between the endorsement of the three groups on the quality ≠ accuracy component failed to reach conventional levels of statistical significance, H(2) = 5.54, p = .063. However, as shown in Figure 2 , the three groups differed in Recall that participants were asked to rate their knowledge on a relatively crude three-point scale from one ('below average') to three ('above average'). The median and modal responses to 4 A second ANOVA was conducted on the memory belief scores of the Chartered Clinical Psychologists and Hypnotherapists that included respondent age and their self-reported years of clinical practice as covariates. The same main effect emerged for sample (CCP scored higher than HT; F 1, 209 = 24.69, p < .001, partial eta 2 = .10) and neither age, nor years of experience, had any effect on the memory belief scores (both F's < .05). We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this analysis.
So what might explain the finding that 75% of the sample 'strongly agreed' that repression can occur? Firstly, the notion of unconscious repression is reinforced in countless books, television shows, films and popular psychology books. Although memory science has proposed a number of relatively mundane explanations of such experiences based on well established memory phenomena that do not require a 'repression' mechanism (McNally, 2012; McNally & Geraerts, 2009 ) this evidence may not be powerful enough to counteract such a powerful cultural 'meme'. Secondly, our questionnaire did not probe beliefs about frequency or likelihood of phenomena. In other words we do not know from the current data whether respondents thought that repression is possible in principle, but might be an extremely rare or extremely common occurrence. Thirdly, although the wording of the question referred to 'unconsciously blocking out memories,' it is possible that this distinction was not obvious or relevant to respondents, and that their responses instead reflected their belief in intentional, motivated, forgetting or indeed other -more colloquial -understandings of the term 'repression' (i.e., 'not thinking' about something). Further research is clearly warranted about what it is that people understand by the term 'repression' although this is unlikely to lead to a clear resolution (see Garry, Loftus & Brown, 1994 for a discussion).
Secondly, in addition to the high rate of endorsement of a repression mechanism, there was evidence of some 'risky' beliefs (Poole et al., 1995) amongst the Hypnotherapist group with 24% of those respondents 'strongly agreeing' that memories from the first year of life are accurately stored and retrievable (15.1% of the sample reported by , responded that people can, with effort, remember events back to birth). Although there is certainly strong evidence that very young infants can 'remember' events (Bauer & Leventon, 2013) , there is also evidence that such memories do not survive in a way that means they are retrievable in adulthood (Bauer & Larkina, 2014) . In addition, just under one fifth of the Hypnotherapist group (17%) 'strongly agreed' that memory accurately 'records' events as they occurred, counter to decades of research providing evidence to the contrary. The evidence of such 'risky' beliefs (e.g., that memories from the first year of life are accurately stored and retrievable) was tempered somewhat by the finding that just over half of the sample (51%) 'strongly agreed' that false memories of non-traumatic events are possible.
This survey was motivated partly by the claim that the findings of memory science may simply reflect common sense (Keane, 2010). Our novel findings relating to the beliefs of UK Chartered Clinical Psychologists and individuals who advertise their services as Hypnotherapists, along with other similar studies on diverse samples of professionals and non-professionals, indicate that this is not the case. In our sample, Chartered Clinical Psychologists answered the Memory Beliefs Questionnaire in a way that was most consistent with the findings of memory science.
However, the findings also suggest that many practitioners would proffer opinions orthogonal to, or in direct contradiction to, the findings of the memory literature (e.g., in relation to the accessibility of memories from the first year of life, or earlier; see Rowan, 2014) . There are two primary causes for concern that relate to how such evidence might enter the criminal justice system. Firstly, although they could not testify as opinion experts in UK courts, they would nevertheless be allowed to testify as witnesses to fact about what their clients could (or could not) remember at any given point in time. Thus -in the case of the current sample -roughly one quarter would give unwarranted credence to memories that are claimed to be from the first year of life and may communicate this misunderstanding to their clients and thus, indirectly, to the courts. Secondly, they may have had a strong influence over the genesis and development of memory claims by communicating their (mis)understanding of memory phenomena to their clients (i.e., that adults' reports of memories from a very young age are likely to be reliable, or that they could have unconsciously 'repressed' memories). To their clients, at least, they are likely to be viewed as experts (Dawes, 1994) . Thus, misconceptions about memory may have been communicated to a client long before a report is made to the police, or the case reaches court. The court is then left with the task of trying to untangle reliable from unreliable aspects of recollections. As a result, the evidence of genuine victims of abuse may then be viewed as less reliable than it would have been had no inappropriate therapeutic intervention taken place.
As with any survey, there are some limitations that should be acknowledged. Firstly, the self-reports about memory knowledge were taken after respondents had given their answers to the questionnaire items. Thus, these ratings are likely to have been affected by the difficulty that respondents had in answering those questions. Had respondents' ratings of their knowledge of the Secondly, the original survey (in which the Memory Belief items were embedded) had a response rate of around 12%. However, this rate does not deviate markedly from the response rates in other similar surveys (15.5%, 13%, Wise, Safer & Maro, 2011) and some of the respondents' characteristics were representative of the populations from which they were drawn (Ost et al., 2013) . Finally, the measure used to assess self-reported knowledge of the scientific literature (adapted from Yapko, 1994) had a limited range (1-3) and therefore may not have been particularly sensitive to variation. It is noteworthy that differences between the three groups emerged, even with this relatively crude measure.
Thirdly, these data were collected in 2007-08 (Clinical Psychologists & Hypnotherapists) and 2009 (Undergraduates). It is of course possible that memory beliefs change over time.
However, the key finding of the present study -that groups could be differentiated based on their latent beliefs regarding the malleability (or otherwise) of memory -replicates findings published around the same time as these data were collected (Niedźwieńska et al., 2007) as well as data published more recently . Fourthly, to aid comprehension, many of the MBQ items were keyed in the same direction. The disadvantage of doing this is that it may have introduced a bias in participants' responses. Any future work would need to correct this potential source of bias. Finally, with the benefit of hindsight, it would have been useful to compare the present findings to 'common sense' groups (i.e., those without any psychological training, like the general public) as well as to a group of memory experts (e.g., Kassin, Tubb, Hosch & Memon, 2001) or those who serve as expert witnesses in court (e.g., Melinder & Magnussen, 2014) .
What do these findings mean for the practice of expert witnesses presenting memory evidence at court? An expert witness is somebody who can present to the court scientific or technical information that is likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of a judge or jury and the judge determines whether such a witness is competent to give evidence as an expert in any given case. The findings of the present survey suggest that Hypnotherapists may be unlikely to be reliable guides to memory science -they had the lowest scores on the memory belief scale but the highest confidence in their own knowledge of the memory literature. The Hypnotherapists were also more likely to endorse 'risky' beliefs (e.g., that memories from the first year of life are accurately stored and retrievable; memory is an accurate record of events). The current findings also suggest that some beliefs about memory science persist, even among highly trained and experienced Clinical Psychologists, which would be at odds with the consensus academic view among researchers in the field (e.g., that the mind is capable of unconsciously blocking out memories of trauma). Thus in cases involving complex memory phenomena, it may be more appropriate to consider seeking the evidence of an expert specializing in memory science, at the pre-court and police investigation stages and in court. 
